tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2489468916453210669.post5702921511620682963..comments2023-07-05T06:10:53.174-04:00Comments on Brain Scam: Zombie, Schmombie - Richard Brown's Efforts to Ressurect MaterialismTony Altermanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/18136925406940818982noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2489468916453210669.post-81250635905325260592009-08-06T15:35:46.456-04:002009-08-06T15:35:46.456-04:00Interesting. However, I am unsure if Zombies have ...Interesting. However, I am unsure if Zombies have been empirically verified.Manus Dakadilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04263595574672934467noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2489468916453210669.post-49441052453002160692008-12-05T20:45:00.000-05:002008-12-05T20:45:00.000-05:00I could decide if zombies and zoombies and whateve...I could decide if zombies and zoombies and whatever else is conceivable-- if you can give me a<BR/>solid notion of consciousness.<BR/> I think the usual split between<BR/>consciousness and content of consciousness,the two mutually<BR/>exclusive,is a problem thus: if consciousness is an idea or experience then, it may be objected, consciousness is the content appearing to consciousness, rather than consciousness itself, since consciousness itelf is not just an idea or an expereince. In other words, that consciousness itself is not just an idea--is itself an idea or experience and so cannot be consciousness itself. So, the question is begged: just what is consciousness? Does it even exist?<BR/> Put differently, anything that appears to consciousness is the content of consciousness rather than consciousness itself, and this content must include any idea or experience that there is such a thing as consciousness, apart from the idea of consciousness. Can one separate the idea from the thing?<BR/>( ultimately can any idea of any thing be separated nicely from that thing?)<BR/> A rejoinder might be that one can perceive directly that consciousness exists--even though words are not up to the task of describing it--- may sound paradoxical or contradictory.<BR/> But the reply to this: as long as consciousness is said to be separated from content<BR/>(as the cartesian mind is from matter) then we cannot know consciousness at all--since any purported experience or perception of consciousness may be considered content of consciousness rather than consciousness itself.<BR/> From this point of view even whether there is or is not consciousness is forever unknowable --since any experience would be content of consciousness rather than consciousness itself.<BR/> Maybe the answer is to drop the idea of consciousness altogether--and its notion of an independent entity apart from content--and just say that stuff shows up. <BR/> This however, would be a threat to the notion that there is some independent entity (an ego?) which <BR/>acts or experiences. <BR/> In other words, if the egoic experiencer is merely content of consciousness then what is consciousness itself? Seems to sweep the rug out from consciousness. And even presuming such a thing as consciousness, it seems we cannot characterize it---<BR/>or indeed conceive it.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2489468916453210669.post-11216726003167061082008-11-03T18:29:00.000-05:002008-11-03T18:29:00.000-05:00I think Brown misses a key notion in Chalmer's two...I think Brown misses a key notion in Chalmer's two-dimensional semantics. He presents many examples of the non-physical datum he claims is part of the concept of consciousness, that is, the qualitative aspect of consciousness. To be a zoombie or a schmoombie is to be using a different concept then 'consciousness', for there is no qualitative aspect to, let me call it, consciousness1 (i.e., consciousness in a zoombie/schmoombie centered world). Maybe Chalmers would reply that what Brown is talking about is not consciousness AT ALL, but consciousness1. I find his points that our inner, consious lives are constitutive of our very concept of consciousness. <BR/><BR/>And for the zombie, they are also not conscious for they lack the constitutive property loosely known as the qualitative properties of the world. But besides that point, the claim related to whether or not we can conceive a zombie comes into play: we have very little access to the physical underpinnings of consciousness (not assuming materialism here but the notion that as a naturalist, there must be SOME relation between qualitative feel and physical activity, i.e., Chalmer's talk about bridging laws and loose supervenience and our concept of consciousness does not rely upon these one whit). <BR/><BR/>Or maybe I am being confused here. I guess I start hearing the klaxon go off when critics of Chalmer's zombie argument do not deal with the fact that our concept of consciousness is based mostly on our inner, conscious lives. Chalmers does not dismiss naturalistic aspects of consciousness, he claims that it is part of the the second dimension of the concept.<BR/><BR/>As an aside, I am reminded of an argument I think Lynn Rudder Baker made against physicalism/materialism. She noted that the Mona Lisa can be mapped down to the last atom that makes up the painting. But the concept, if you want to call it that, of "the painting called The Mona Lisa" cannot be reducible to that physical description, for their are so many other properties of "the painting of The Mona Lisa" that are part of the concept: its history, its place in art, the aesthetic properties, ad nauseum. And the problem gets worse when you try to reduce concepts such as "liquidity" in economics or "malicious intent" in law to solely physical description. Off the subject of zombies but I think there is a categorical mistake hereWholeflafferhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03923122826431229024noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2489468916453210669.post-2279660037361159642008-10-19T18:13:00.000-04:002008-10-19T18:13:00.000-04:00D'oh!!! Sorry about that...I'll change it immediat...D'oh!!! Sorry about that...I'll change it immediately!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com